Security-critical applications such as malware, fraud, or spam detection, require machine learning models that operate on examples from constrained discrete domains. In these settings, gradient-based attacks that rely on adding perturbations often fail to produce adversarial examples that meet the domain constraints, and thus are not effective. We introduce a graphical framework that (1) formalizes existing attacks in discrete domains, (2) efficiently produces valid adversarial examples with guarantees of minimal cost, and (3) can accommodate complex cost functions beyond the commonly used p-norm. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this method by crafting adversarial examples that evade a Twitter bot detection classifier using a provably minimal number of changes.
Introduction
Many classes of machine learning models are vulnerable to efficient gradient-based attacks that produce adversarial examples that can fool a classifier at test time [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Most of these attacks rely on adding specific perturbations to regular examples such that the adversarial examples stay within the original data distribution. Hence, they are often indistinguishable from regular examples, but at the same time exploit the imperfectness of the model to cause classification errors. The assumption that one can perturb an example while remaining within the data distribution is rather easily satisfied in domains in which perturbations consist of small modifications to many real-valued inputs. One such domain is images. As long as the perturbation is small or concentrated in a region of an image, the perturbed example likely results in another image of the same class.
Security-critical applications of machine learning, like malware, spam, or fraud detection, however, often use hand-crafted features that are constrained by the particular application. In such constrained domains it is not uncommon that perturbing examples results in feature vectors that cannot appear in real life [8] [9] [10] [11] . For example, modifying a malware binary may prevent the detection of the binary as malware, but it could also make the binary non-executable anymore; or a perturbed representation of a text may change the output of a classifier [12] , but it would not correspond to a plausible text in terms of semantics or grammar. Therefore, while it would be very beneficial to understand the impact of adversarial examples in security-critical domains, it is not straightforward to adapt the aforementioned gradient-based attacks to such scenarios.
A second problem with previous approaches is that, even if the modified examples are valid, the chosen modifications may require a costly transformation. For example, an attacker may find that a Twitter bot can avoid detection by increasing the number of replies to its tweets. However, to achieve this increase the bot operator may need to invest a lot of money to either create or buy more bots to reply to the tweets, or produce attractive content. Ideally, adversarial examples should require minimal investment to evade detection. The typical cost model used in existing methods, the L p norm of the perturbation, however, might not be suitable to capture the complex manipulation costs [13, 14] required in discrete domains.
In this paper we introduce a framework to efficiently find adversarial examples suitable for constrained discrete domains such as those underlying security applications of machine learning. In this framework the space of possible adversarial manipulations is represented as a weighted directed graph -referred to as a transformation graph. Each node in the graph is a transformed example, each edge is a transformation, and the edge weight represents the cost of the transformation. Such graphical representation has the following advantages. First, explicitly defining the descendants for each node captures the feasibility constraints of the domain: the transitive closure for a given starting node represents the set of all possible transformations of that example. Second, the graph can capture non-trivial manipulation cost functions through its structure: the cost of a sequence of manipulations can be modeled as the sum of edge weights along a path from the original to the transformed example. Third, this representation is orthogonal to the machine learning model being attacked, as well as to the adversary's knowledge of this model. In Appendix A we show how this framework is a generalization of many existing attacks in discrete domains [6, 9, 10, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] .
When the adversary knows the parameters of the model we show how this framework can be used as a basis to perform informed graph search with provable guarantees. Provided a heuristic based on the pointwise adversarial robustness of the classifier [20] over a superset of the constrained domain, this search can perform optimal attacks in terms of (minimal) transformation cost. However, computing such a heuristic may incur in unacceptable computational burden depending on the domain. For this cases we show how the framework enables to perform sub-optimal attacks while provably guaranteeing an upper bound on the sub-optimality of the transformation cost.
Being able to obtain bounds on the cost of adversarial examples has key implications for securitycritical applications. From the adversary's perspective, it determines the minimal amount of resources in order to mount an attack. From the defender's perspective, it provides the model designer with a guarantee of security under a given threat model. We note that the latter is equivalent to the traditional evaluation of classifiers' robustness in adversarial conditions: finding the radius of a norm-ball (where norm represents the cost) within which the classifier's decisions are stable [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] .
We demonstrate the feasibility of the optimal instantiation of the attack against a realistic Twitter bot detector. We evaluate the attack against a naïve approach -exhaustive search over the transformation graph. We also provide an analysis of the provable guarantees the defender can obtain on its classifier.
Model and goal
In this section we introduce the evasion attacks against machine learning classifiers, and formalize the adversary model and the graphical framework approach.
As an illustrative example we consider a toy Twitter bot detection classifier that takes as input the days since the account was created, and the total number of replies to the tweets made by this account, and outputs a binary decision: bot or not. In this setting the adversary's goal is to, starting from an arbitrary account, create a bot that evades the detector by only modifying these two features. The adversary wishes to keep these modifications to a minimum: increasing the lifetime of the account costs time, and increasing the number of replies to the account's tweets requires engaging real users or deploying other bots.
Preliminaries
In this work we focus on binary classifiers, F : X → {0, 1} that produce a decision {0, 1} by thresholding a discriminant function:
where the discriminant function is a composition of a possibly non-linear feature mapping φ : X → R d from some input space X to a feature space R d , and a linear function f :
This encompasses several families of models in machine learning, including logistic regression, SVM, and neural network-based classifiers.
Adversary model: the graphical framework
The adversary uses the "mimicry" strategy [8] , i.e., she starts with a known initial example x ∈ X and applies structure-preserving transformations until the transformed example, x , causes a misclassification.
The adversary's goal is to find an adversarial example that incurs minimal manipulation cost. This problem can be formulated as an optimization problem:
where x is a given initial example, and C(x, x ) > 0 is the adversarial cost. C models the "price" that an adversary pays to transform example x into x . The minimal C(x, x * ) for a given x is known as (pointwise) robustness [20, 26] , or minimal adversarial cost (MAC) [27] .
In practice, due to computational constraints the adversary solves a relaxed problem obtaining approximate solutionsx that are within an ε multiplicative bound from the minimal cost adversarial examples:
Following security practices, we assume a worst-case adversary that has full knowledge of the target model parameters, including w, b and the feature mapping φ.
We formalize the transformations an adversary can perform as a transformation graph. This is a directed weighted graph G = (V, E, ω), with V ⊆ X. Each edge (x, x ) ∈ E represents the modification of an example x into an example x . For each edge (x, x ) ∈ E the function ω defines the manipulation cost ω(x, x ) > 0 associated to that modification. For a given path
. → x n in the graph, we define the path cost, representing the cost of performing that chain of transformations, as the sum of edge costs along it:
Within the graphical framework, the problem in Equation 1 is reduced to minimizing the manipulation cost as defined by the graph G, narrowing the search space to only those x that are reachable from x:
where C G (x, x ) is defined as the minimal path cost over all paths from x to x :
Since the problem in Equation 2 is specific to a transformation graph, solving it allows to evaluate robustness of the model to a particular model of adversarial capabilties. Example 1. Let us consider a transformation graph for the toy Twitter bot classification problem. For each feature vector v ∈ V , there exist up to four children in the graph: an example with the value of the the number of days since account creation feature incremented by one, or decremented by one; and analogously two children for number of replies to the tweets. Let all edges have cost 1. In such a graph the cost of a transformation chain is the number of edges traversed, e.g., incrementing the number of days since account creation by three is equivalent to a path consisting of three nodes (path cost of 3). The adversary's goal is to find the path with the lowest cost (minimal number of transformations) that flips the classifier's decision. The resulting account is the solution to Equation 2.
This graphical framework allows to cast the problem of finding adversarial examples as graph search. In Section 5 we give an overview of existing attacks over discrete domains, and in Appendix A we instantiate several existing attacks using the framework.
Minimal-cost attacks using heuristic graph search
One way to find an optimal, or admissible, solution to Equation 2 that incurs minimal cost is using uniform-cost search [28] . However, this approach may be inefficient or even infeasible. Let us constrain the transformation graph in Example 1, where the branching factor is 4, to performing at most 30 decrements or increments to any of the features. The number of nodes in this graph is bounded by n = 4 30 = 2 60 . Given that uniform-cost search (UCS) needs to expand n nodes in the worst case, if a single expansion takes a nanosecond, full graph traversal would take 36 years.
For certain settings, however, it is possible to use heuristics to identify the best direction in which to traverse the graph, significantly speeding up the search. Heuristic search algorithms, like A * [28] , or iteratively-deepening A * [29] , can find the solution to the problem in Equation 2. To ensure that these algorithms find the admissible x * it is sufficient 1 that the heuristic is admissible [30] :
Optimal instantiation
We now detail one realistic setting for which there exists an admissible heuristic. Let the input domain X be a discrete subset of the vector space R m , and let the cost of an edge (x, x ) in the transformation graph be the L p distance between examples x and x : ω(x, x ) = L p (x, x ). This is similar to typical cost functions in adversarial machine learning [31] . We show in Section 4, however, that the structure of the transformation graph can encode more complex cost functions even if the edge cost is L p .
Let S ⊆ R m be a superset of X, e.g., S can be a continuous closure of a discrete X. Let r p denote the MAC of the classifier at input x, with cost C(x, x ) set to L p (x, x ), and the search space being S.
Using the fact that the search space is a subset of R m , r p can be simplified from Equation 1 to the following:
For some models, this r p (x) can be either computed using formal methods [20, 21, 32] , or bounded analytically, yielding a lower bound η p (x) [22, 25, 33] . The known methods usually perform the computation over a box-constrained S = I 1 × I 2 × · · · × I m for some contiguous intervals I j ⊂ R. For linear models r p (x) can be computed exactly and efficiently as distance from a point to the decision hyperplane of the classifier [23] .
Any lower bound η p on the r p over any S such that X ⊆ S, can be used to construct an admissible heuristic h p,x for a given starting example x: This heuristic shows a lower bound on a path cost from an example x to any adversarial example. Figure 1 illustrates this when the classifier is a linear model. Exact value of the heuristic for linear models. The MAC r p (x) over a continuous R m can be computed efficiently for linear models [23] . In terms of the graphical framework, there are two settings where this is applicable: (1) when the edge cost is defined over the feature space: ω(a, b) = L p (φ(a), φ(b)), which makes the problem in Equation 1 similar to the feature adversary attack [34] ; and (2) when the feature map is an identity transformation φ(x) = x, that is, the model is a linear In these cases, r p is a distance from a point z = φ(x) to the linear decision hyperplane defined by f (z) = w z + b:
where q is the Hölder conjugate of p: 1 p + 1 q = 1.
ε-admissible relaxations. A number of works are dedicated to bounded relaxations of the admissibility properties of A * search, trading off the admissibility guarantees for computational efficiency [35] [36] [37] [38] . In this paper, we employ static weighting [35] for its simplicity. In this approach the heuristic is multiplied by ε > 1. This results in adversarial examples that have at most ε higher cost than MAC.
Experimental evaluation
We now evaluate our framework against a realistic instantiation of Twitter bot detection. We use a dataset of extracted features for Twitter bot classification by Gilani et al. [39] . Each example in the dataset represents aggregated information about a Twitter account in April of 2016. Accounts are human-labeled as bots or real humans. We report results for accounts with under 1,000 followers. We obtained similar results for more popular accounts.
Each account has the following associated features: the number of tweets, retweets, favourites, lists, and replies, the average number of URLs, the size of attached content, average likes and retweets per tweet, and the list of apps that were used to post tweets (summarized in Table 1 ).
Implementation. The code to run the attacks is available as a Python package 2 . We use scikitlearn [40] for training and evaluation of machine learning models, Jupyter notebooks [41] for visualizations, and GNU Parallel [42] for running simulated scenarios. Target model. We use a linear model as the target classifier, since it allows us to use the exact value of the heuristic (Section 3.1). We use regularized logistic regression, trained using a 5-fold cross-validation on 90% of the data, and tested on 10% of the data.
Discretization. We bucketize all the numerical features (e.g., size of attached content) into a number of buckets that correspond to quantiles, as computed on the training data. We run the attacks using a number of buckets from 5 to 100 which, as explained below, effectively defines the size of the transformation graph. After quantization, we one-hot encode these features. The list of apps that were used to post the tweets are represented as follows. For each app (6 in total), two bits are set: one if it was used, and zero if it was not.
Transformation graph and adversarial cost. For each bucketized feature in a feature vector we define two transformations: change it to the next larger, and resp. smaller, bucket. For the buckets in the extremes only one transformation is possible. Thus, the more buckets are used for discretizing numerical features, the larger is the graph size. In a transformed example, the further the changed bucket is from the original value, the more transformations are needed, and the larger is the path cost. For the list of apps feature, we define one transformation per app, flipping the bits that represent whether the app was used or not.
We set the edge weights to L 1 distance between feature vectors. Because of the way we encoded the features, each transformation has a cost of 2 (one bit is set to zero, and another bit to one). Hence, a path cost in this graph is proportional to the number of feature changes, either of bucketized features, or the list of apps feature.
Performance. For each example in the full dataset we run uniform-cost search (UCS), to obtain a baseline for the cost, and A * with h p,x heuristic. For A * , we also run ε-bounded relaxations of A * with different values of ε. In Figure 2 (left) we show the details for the best-performing model (87% test accuracy), the one using 20 buckets for discretization. We find that for those examples that do not require many changes, both A * and UCS traverse parts of the graph of similar sizes. When the number of nodes that need to be traversed gets larger, the speed-up of A * becomes more prominent. Moreover, increasing ε weight significantly speeds up the search, e.g., by two orders of magnitude for ε = 5. Table 4 , Appendix C, presents some of the obtained adversarial examples and the corresponding feature transformations.
Provable guarantees. First, we evaluate the increase in cost of adversarial examples found with ε-bounded relaxations of A * over those of optimal MAC adversarial examples found with UCS or A * . We find that ε-relaxations of A * through static weighting give an extremely pessimistic cost Second, we measure the difference between adversarial robustness over S = R m and path costs of MAC adversarial examples found using graph search. We show the results in Fig. 2 (right) . The path costs of MAC adversarial examples w.r.t. transformation graph are lower bounded by adversarial robustness over R m , and are up to 2.6× higher when pointwise robustness over L 1 is greater than 1.
In Figure 3 we show the distributions of obtained pointwise robustness guarantees over the test dataset. The average robustness in L 1 space is 2.2, whereas the average cost of MAC examples w.r.t. the transformation graph is 4.2. Our approach hence produces a more precise robustness measure, tailored through the transformation graph to a particular model of domain constraints and adversary's capabilities.
Related work
Jacobian saliency map approach (JSMA) [6] is a greedy white-box attack that picks candidate example transformations to maximize saliency, which is computed using the forward gradient of a model. Approaches similar to this have been widely applied to craft adversarial examples in discrete domains in the form of greedy hill climbing algorithm using a heuristic based on a forward gradient of the model, e.g., for text recognized by recurrent neural networks [15] , user-item relationship vectors for recommender systems [10] , feature vectors that represent malware binaries [16] , or malware binaries directly [11] .
Multiple works study evasion attacks against text classifiers, starting with adversarial spam classification [27] , and including more recent works [9, 17, 18, 43] . These attacks commonly employ hill climbing algorithm over possible modifications, similar or based on JSMA. HotFlip [9] also greedily optimizes the forward gradient-based heuristic, but runs beam search. Alzantot et al. [44] use an evolutionary algorithm.
For malware, several works have explored evasion attacks using different adversarial examples generation methods. Xu et al. [45] use a black-box evolutionary algorithm to generate adversarial malware binaries. Dang et al. [46] use a black-box hill climbing algorithm over feasible transformations.
To the best of our knowledge, none of these approaches have guarantees regarding the obtained adversarial examples, and commonly consider L p norms as cost functions. Our instantiation is able to provable guarantees regarding the cost of obtained adversarial examples.
Many of these attacks can be instantiated within our graphical framework. See Appendix A for details.
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a graphical framework to formalize evasion attacks in discrete domains that casts attacks as search over a graph of valid transformations.
In settings with a discrete input space X ⊂ R m , and the adversary's transformation cost being the L p distance between examples, this framework obtains adversarial examples that incur minimal cost for the adversary with white-box knowledge using A * search. This method produces a focused pointwise robustness guarantee for a given model of adversarial capabilities. We evaluated the attack against a Twitter bot classifier, showing that it can produce adversarial examples within an ε-bound of the minimal adversarial cost, using significantly lower computational runtime than exhaustive search. We found that static heuristic ε-weighting gives a pessimistic optimality bound. More work is needed to produce tighter optimality bounds, e.g., applying other relaxations of A * . while OPEN is not empty do 5: v ← remove node from OPEN with the lowest recorded value of f -score 6: if goal(v) then return v 7:
for each child v of v in G do 9: score-value ← score(v, v ) 10: if v not in OPEN or CLOSED then 11:
Record v into OPEN with score-value 12: if v is in OPEN or CLOSED and score-value is lower than recorded then 13: Replace v with the updated score-value in the respective set 14: if v is in CLOSED then 15: Move v to OPEN Greedy best-first [48] h(v ) Uniform-cost [28] ω
Algorithm pqueue
Hill climbing Limited to one highest-scoring item Best-first beam search [47] Limited to B highest-scoring items A Instantiations of attacks in discrete domains as best-first search
A.1 Best-first search algorithms
In Algorithm 1 we show the pseudocode of a variant of generalized best-first search called BF * [30] . Several common search algorithms, like uniform-cost search, greedy best-first search, and A * variants, are specializations of BF * . They differ in their instantiation of the scoring function used to select the best nodes at each step of the algorithm. Additionally, by limiting the number of items in data structure holding candidate nodes, one can obtain best-first beam search and hill climbing algorithms [47] . We summarize these differences in Table 2 .
A.2 Instantiations
We can use the graphical framework formalization, described in Section 2, to instantiate several existing attacks against machine learning classifiers in discrete domains. Table 3 outlines the instantiations of these attacks as applications of best-first search over a transformation graph. The attacks differ in their general setting, transformation graphs, and the scoring function choice. Note that for all cases, each child in a transformation graph (column expansions in the table) represents a single atomic transformation. Transformations thus compound with the depth of the traversal of the graph. For those attacks that can be instantiated as greedy search, if cost is shown, it is enforced by truncating the transformation graph once a certain cost threshold is reached. Observe that if F (x) = F (x ), the heuristic is equal to zero, and hence is trivially admissible. Indeed, it cannot overestimate C G (x , x * ) due to the fact that ω(a, b) ≥ 0 and C G (a, b) ≥ 0 for any a, b ∈ V .
It is therefore sufficient to show that if F (x) = F (x ), the lower bound on adversarial robustness at x over S never overestimates C G (x , x * ):
The following sequence holds:
The first equality is by definition of r p (see Equation 4 ).
Since r p (x ) is the norm of the smallest adversarial perturbation over S, the distance from x to s ∈ S is smaller than the distance from x to any other q ∈ X ⊆ S that also flips the decision of the classifier: L p (x , s) ≤ L p (x , q) (for any q ∈ X s.t. F (q) = F (x ))
Hence, the first inequality.
By Equation 3, C G (x , x * ) is a path cost for some path:
By triangle property of the L p metric, the second inequality holds:
Hence, r p (x ) ≤ C G (x, x * ), which implies Equation 5, and concludes the proof. 
C Supplementary figures

